Seamanship Quotation

“In political activity, then, men sail a boundless and bottomless sea; there is neither harbour for shelter nor floor for anchorage, neither starting-place nor appointed destination.”
— from Michael Oakeshott's
“Political Education” (1951)
Showing posts with label Canadian foreign policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Canadian foreign policy. Show all posts

Friday, February 7, 2014

A Canadian foreign policy? The idea.

I knew a wonderful cynic long ago who loved politics and wrote like a high-strung angel. Hunched over a cigarillo and a martini, he once shrugged, “Policy is as cheap as paper and a typewriter.” 

Finally, I’ve got it: policy — without law, resources, or responsibly — is just talk, in text. And talk usually is cheap.

This thought is not welcome in modern government, especially in policy shops, in constrained circumstances. Many policy activists, in fact, have set forth the proposition that even if government can’t do anything well, it can at least do important thinking — elevating our aspirations and passing on our best practices to less fortunate societies elsewhere.

Pretentious nonsense.

Along with the regrettable squander of talent, the treatment of policy as art has a malign narcotic effect: it interferes with our proper and continuing obligation to discover how to be more effective in this challenging world.

The above musings weren’t inspired by my own lost causes as a policy writer. Rather, they crystalized as I read two high-minded essays on the esoteric topic of "Canadian foreign policy" by two eminent Canadian journalists: John Ibbitson of the Globe and Mail and Richard Gwyn of the Toronto Star. Their thesis is the same: captain Stephen Harper has fundamentally changed Canada’s foreign policy — and not for the better.

This is both an easy and extravagant argument to make.

It’s easy to research. Formal government speeches and grieving former diplomats baldly tell the story: Harper is less multilateral and more bilateral in pursuing trade and upholding alliance priorities with the US. He doesn’t nurture or use soft power and he doesn’t trim alliance rhetoric in order to advance what’s called Pearsonian diplomacy. He misses chances to offer a Canadian twist on other countries’ strategic difficulties.

However, what’s the big deal? What the original "Canadian foreign policy" was and what it’s becoming now is almost entirely a domestic Canadian affair. Indeed, it is entirely possible that — apart from NSA eavesdroppers — the outside world has no appreciation that Canada’s best minds are seized with alarm because they think Canada’s government is approaching the world with a new agenda.

This leads to a twist on that nauseating conundrum about not hearing that noble tree falling in the forest: if others haven’t noticed Harper’s “Big Break," was there actually a Canadian policy there in the first place?

Canada is an American ally, with no enemies or special friends of its own. On strategic issues in Washington and in the Middle East, for instance, it supports America and Israel’s strategic imperatives. And it has done so, unswervingly, since the St. Laurent government and its popular External Affairs Secretary Lester Pearson helped Eisenhower help France and Britain surrender their last imperial illusions in 1956. Pearson was awarded a Nobel Prize, and Canada started listening to the rest of the world on behalf of Washington rather than on behalf of London.

Canada’s self-regard in foreign relations was not earned by making independently shrewd, noble, strategic policy choices. It was born of the passive crafts of diplomat.

As the senior English-speaking colony of the greatest power of the 19th century, Canada’s bureaucracy-builders decided on their own that they could be the next superpower’s empathetic listeners. They could listen knowingly to the powerful and the powerless. Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnston, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, the Bushes, Clinton (less so), and even Obama would benefit from timely gossip and nudges from Ottawa as they threw their weight around globally.

Talk in the Canadian federal government is often about policy, and talk about policy choices often leads to action. Trade policies lead to commercial initiatives; immigration policy changes affect workloads in embassies and the fates of thousands of individuals who want to live in Canada.

Talking geopolitics vicariously, however, isn’t doing strategic foreign policy. 

Have all those sophisticates in the Pearson Building in Ottawa essentially been talking to themselves? No. Tactically, Canada doesn’t send forces to every conflict or aid only to American priorities. However, Canadian foreign policy per se is pure words; their assembly and observation does little more than feed and clothe wordsmiths, who doggedly take themselves too seriously.

Thursday, February 2, 2012

Will China be Canada’s future?

Canada has a neighbor that now fears for its future, elects to its Congress men and women who would repeal the mixed economy of the 20th  century, forgets to recognize Canada as a foreign country, and a president (and Canada’s most popular politician) that blocks the Keystone Pipeline Project, the centerpiece of Canada’s Western growth engine.

These developments, naturally, nudge Canadians to think about their options. The ensuing discussion, unfortunately, has settled quickly on an old Canadian idea: Hey, let’s find another great market and sympathetic friend—on another continent.

Trade diversification is an old, incremental, and immensely popular idea. However, Prime Minister Stephen Harper, an empiricist and bedrock North American conservative, has chosen to lead the parade and has given that lovably concoction “diversification” a real face: China.

You don’t have to be a visionary as well as a Canadian politician to pick China. Everything said about that country reeks of strategic necessity. It’s a superpower on the way to becoming the world’s biggest economy . . . right?

Almost everyone you meet from there is driven by the commercial incentives that thrived in North America’s younger days. Their executives and entrepreneurs come in private jets, flanked by distinguished Canadian retainers, carrying billions in their pockets.

Harper’s pivot to China has been easy—up to now. Corporate services in Toronto, land-locked energy companies in Calgary, and Canadians who generally think it’s the height of sophistication to make plans for America’s collapse have all applauded Harper’s shift, at least conceptually.  

The problem is that the idea is looking to be realizable—perhaps too much so.

The Chinese Government is interested—and has the means—to become a powerful player in the development of Western Canada. However, in order for China to secure ownership of and reliable access to Western Canada’s immense energy and natural resources, Canadians must be prepared to set aside the very concerns that worried them about those pushy 20th  century Americans—and accommodate a few new ones.

Can you imagine the outrage if even a duly-elected American federal government purchased a $2B Alberta oil sands project without a Foreign Investment Review hearing? Well, the Government of China—a totalitarian superpower—just accomplished that and also is effectively bankrolling the planning of a Northern Gateway pipeline alternative to the Keystone project. This is finally stirring concern.

Terry Glavin’s article “Pipeline to Beijing” in the National Post vigorously surveys many of the issues.


My post of March 3rd last year also argued that ownership of Canadian resources by the government of a touchy superpower would involve infringements on future Canadian policy-making that would go dangerously beyond the normal accommodations that are made to attract private commercial investors.


Favoring a new superpower in the scramble to develop Western Canada entails a range of issues for liberals, economic nationalists, and conservatives—as well as environmentalists. Also, there is growing unease among those Canadians whose interests and hearts are emphatically aligned with the US.

Enhanced trade with China is a good thing. That objective, however, would be better secured if Harper stopped sounding like he’s willing to corrupt decision-making processes in Canada and strain his alliance with the US in order to get there. Indeed, he and President Obama would be well advised to jointly soothe concerns in both countries by getting a little more excited about advancing their shared economic interests. 

Friday, March 11, 2011

China’s public corporations are “commercial”—just like ours

The International Energy Agency (IEA) obliged its international member states recently by baldly asserting in a report that China’s formally communist public energy corporations operate on their own. Said the report’s co-author Julie Jiang in a release, “These are far from puppet companies operating under control of the Chinese government, as many have assumed. Their investments in recent years have been driven by a strong commercial interest, not the whim of the state.”
This statement of opinion, allegedly, will help the Government of Canada allow government-owned Chinese energy companies to buy energy assets in Canada. Ottawa needs explicit assurances that these companies will make “commercial” decisions, rather than political ones, and, handily, a renowned think-tank has said they can.
“It’s an authoritative, international, Western-oriented agency,” said Wenran Jiang of the report in an interview, who holds a research chair at the University of Alberta’s China Institute. “If they [IEA] identify these trends, then it makes the life of bureaucrats in Ottawa so much easier” in dealing with Chinese acquisitions.”
This is surprising. The finding of the IEA is a sham platitude that we use about our own commercial crown corporations, and it is beside the point.
You don’t get to be appointed the CEO of a government corporation in France, Canada, Quebec, Ontario or China without already demonstrating exceptional political skill. You must have the ability to not need to be directed by the state in making business decisions that the state will find to its liking. Great bureaucracies everywhere aren’t led by “puppets” but by politicians—whether friends of a president or not.
It’s silly to expect politicians heading ministries or their agencies to be “commercial” during office hours and to play politics strictly on weekends.
The unacknowledged and obvious problem for Canada, however, is that the prospective corporate buyer is an emerging superpower. If it takes offence when our regulators assert a Canadian interest, it can cause us significant harm.
We have already chosen to have a lopsided relationship with our powerful neighbour by choosing to be independent. However, we have been political and military allies, and we trade with each other according to the rule of law.
Canada has no reassuring track record of respectfully disagreeing with the People’s Republic of China. Their bids for Canadian assets may be too good to resist. Tangible net benefits may be compelling. Nevertheless, it should be well considered in advance: once a piece of Canada is owned by the proud state of China, can it ever again be regulated as just another commercial enterprise?

Tuesday, November 9, 2010

Michael Ignatieff’s speech on Canadian foreign policy

By coincidence, the day this blog urged Canadian Liberals to return to their great tradition of advancing and modernizing Canada’s destiny as North Americans, Michael Ignatieff addressed the Montreal Council of Foreign Relations. His speech was probably in the “can” before this blog proffered advice. However, the extraordinary absence of anything of substance in his speech about the United States or the circumstances we share is noteworthy, to put it diplomatically.
In 3,900 words, entitled “Rebuilding Canada’s Leadership on the World Stage," he addressed over 80 acronyms, individuals, countries, capitals, global issues, institutions, arrangements, tensions, recent Canadian embarrassments, and diplomatic modalities.
At about the 3,000-word mark, Ignatieff observed: “Meanwhile, our border with the United Sates remains an obstacle to greater tourism and trade. We need to be thinning the border, not thickening it.”  Had he used the term “the 49th”, he would have managed to canvass the globe without any reference to the United States.
The world is a big place. Nevertheless, except for the United States of America, in one speech, he was able to say something encouraging to offer almost every Canadian NGO and policy desk in the Department of External Affairs. His criticism of Stephen Harper was unreserved: an unlovable incompetent driven by “domestic politics” when he should be a global leader. In its evasions, however, this major speech was timorous.
(A Liberal paper released in June included two pages on “Renewing Partnerships in North America.” A Liberal government would “revitalize” the status quo by undertaking greater public advocacy in the United States and further collaboration in Washington on energy and the environment. Essentially, they’d do a better job with the same US files now on Harper’s desk.)
Ignatieff must know that our thick border is a direct manifestation not of failed diplomacy, but of longstanding national policies in our two countries. The border between Germany and France is open while ours is shut because, on our continent, we’ve decided to do politics differently. He must know as well that our border will not open unless Canada addresses anew how we relate to the United States and how we define our sovereignty—not as citizens of the world, but first as North Americans.
Fifteen years ago, the Chretien government could separate its affable global ambitions from its business relations with the United States—the un-dramatic cornerstone of the emerging global economy. Today, however, to speak on one day about the world and later, if at all, about the United States misses the mark: America is central to how Canadians provide for themselves and advance their interests and idealism internationally.