Seamanship Quotation

“In political activity, then, men sail a boundless and bottomless sea; there is neither harbour for shelter nor floor for anchorage, neither starting-place nor appointed destination.”
— from Michael Oakeshott's
“Political Education” (1951)
Showing posts with label Canada-US relations. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Canada-US relations. Show all posts

Thursday, January 5, 2017

Canada’s interests in US elections? Please.

Here’s a dry twig to add to the bonfire of sorrows over last year’s presidential election. For a sitting president, securing votes in primaries and general elections beats any business and political relationship, even with Canada. “Even a good president’s feelings don’t count for much” should be stamped at the top of every fat memo about Canada’s geopolitical options.  

Barack Obama completed his historic presidency thinking as a Democratic politician: about his party’s interests, its allies, and its vanities about what’s best. The sweaty old pols were wrong. He didn’t overthink. He calculated and acted as a partisan president.

Being liberal-minded as well, Canadians decided eight years ago that Obama would be serving our interests when serving the “better angels” of America. If nothing happened, we’d accept that it wasn’t important or that our prime minister was on the wrong side ideologically—that, for instance, having a liberal across the table from another liberal would work wonders. It was gauche to raise structural issues: the asymmetry of economic and political power, the Democratic Party’s protectionist base, and the pesky fact that two-term presidents, like two-term prime ministers, usually become a touch arbitrary, and slightly bewitched by their power.

Canadians think about America’s future every day. And we hoped Obama would think sympathetically about us now and then. However, being a partisan in 2016, Obama spent his political capital strictly shoring up support for his party and his own presidency with US voters. Period.

Obama stopped promoting his own TPP trade deal with its enhanced trade terms for Canada and allies in Asia, and freed his candidate Hillary Clinton to campaign against it. He worked and dined with our new liberal Prime Minister several times through the year, without giving Canada any ground on softwood lumber quotas, or “Buy America” procurement practices, or even a down payment for the US half of the Gordie Howe International Bridge.  And, possibly of greater longer-term consequence, Obama never clearly championed the case for a common North American tax on carbon, a declaration that would have strengthened the credibility of Obama’s Paris agreement on Climate Change in Canada.

We can’t blame nasty 2016 for any of it.

It was hardly a bad year for Obama personally, or for America’s economy, or for the election prospects of his party, right through the first 10 happy months of the year. He didn’t trim his support for free trade or neglect Canada-US relations for a greater good: say, for instance, stopping a phony socialist or fascistic, vulgar amateur from winning the White House. His candidate Hillary Clinton was winning big, right up to their last joint campaign rally. Furthermore, until midsummer it was assumed that the Republicans would barely get their act together and would lose with a run-of-the-mill mainstream free trader or unelectable boor.

Yet again, Obama played US electoral politics to the hilt, without regard to friends in the bleachers.


Wednesday, March 18, 2015

Ambassador Heyman: Powerless Ottawa’s personnel narratives

Being in politics without power used to drive good men to drink. Today they settle for storytelling. They feed and write narratives. Because they live in the capital of the One Big Country that decided to nestle beside, and not inside, the center of its own civilization, they read Globe and Mail stories about personalities and their chemistry in Ottawa.

Today’s front-pager “The U.S. ambassador who got left out in the cold” by Campbell Clark reports darkly that Ambassador Bruce Heyman is not being entertained as a valued friend by the amateurish Harper government. Unfortunately, he buries a wonderful observation, demonstrating how more sophisticated governments used to work on U.S. ambassadors:

“Former deputy prime minister John Manley noted the Chrétien government figured only one person in the U.S. administration woke up every day thinking about Canada, so they’d better get close.”

Ambassadors from Washington exist in Ottawa to permit men and women in elected positions of power in Washington to concentrate on anything but Canada. They service networks within Ottawa; they deliver messages and bits of gossip.


If we need powerful American politicians to wake up thinking about Canada, we’ll have to send them to work in Washington as our representatives.

Tuesday, February 25, 2014

Liberal Party’s infatuation with American power politics

Trivia hunter alert: Next year’s Canadian election will be fought on the 50th anniversary of George Grant’s futile attack on Canadian Liberalism’s then-unbounded awe of American power and technique.

In 1965, Lament for a Nation ridiculed the country’s solemn Liberal leadership as philistines, with adolescent arms outstretched in love. Events and opportunities such as Watergate, the Tea Party, and the Iraq wars, not Grant’s scolding, however, put that love on ice.

Justin Trudeau’s father and every Liberal leader since have taken care to appear to never give Washington the benefit of the doubt. In addition, they conceived within their own intellectual circles a new nationalism that emphasized Canada’s worldliness, its multilateral associations, and not its North American alliance. They never missed a chance to display proper distance from and concern for the vitality of American governance. 

Liberals, in fact, designed highly effective election campaigns against Conservatives who could be suspected of being too influenced by Ronald Reagan’s charm, too optimistic about America’s future, or brainwashed by every wave of American rightwing extremism.

Last weekend’s Liberal policy convention and Justin Trudeau’s formal policy address, however, signaled an empathic return to their earlier passion: a heartfelt concern for America’s respect for us and a less-than-pure-hearted confidence that Harper’s problems with Obama can be exploited electorally.

Less noteworthy was their unselfconscious recruitment of American political and intellectual stars. Lawrence Summers is as appealing to Canadian conservatives as he is to liberal audiences, and Obama’s deputy campaign manager, Jennifer O’Malley Dillon, didn’t offer ideas on campaign tactics that winning US consultants aren’t already being paid to sell to audiences in other foreign democracies.

The most striking display of their reawakened American infatuation was the utterance of and audience response to two Ottawa-Gothic assertions by Trudeau:

“It is a fundamental economic responsibility for the Prime Minister of Canada to help get our resources to global markets. More and more, the way to do that is with a robust environmental policy that gives assurances to our trading partners that those resources are being developed responsibly.”

Analyst and author Paul Wells singularly noted that these statements received an exceptionally enthusiastic standing ovation.

Audiences of Canada’s "natural governing" party, of course, admire qualified sentences and are easily excited by expressions of concern for the good regard of governors elsewhere. Still, Trudeau and his audience last Saturday weren’t thinking about polluters in Beijing or inconsequential bureaucrats in shrinking European resource markets.

They’re convinced that as prime minister, Justin Trudeau would better impress Barack Obama and his administration than Stephen Harper. Also, they’re likely sure that the rejection of the Keystone XL pipeline would grievously hurt Harper, especially in the growing affluent West that he absolutely must sweep to get re-elected. 

(This issue, for Liberals, unfortunately, has nothing to do with political integration; it’s strictly about sophisticated head-off government relations — the chemistry of two capitals, not the common qualities of their citizens.)

These new Liberal calculations may turn to dust if, eventually, Obama decides to go with the pro-pipeline majorities in Washington’s Republican and Democratic caucuses. Nevertheless, what’s historically interesting is the now-palpable eagerness of Liberals to attack Harper for not being cool in Obama’s bunker in Washington.

They seem sure that “standing up for Canada” with this President is counterproductive, unsophisticated, and embarrassing.

Is it inconceivable that Harper could turn and do to Justin Trudeau what Jean Chrétien did to Progressive Conservatives in the '90s?

Could, 50 years later, the least red Tory conservative since Lament for a Nation suffer at the fate of Grant’s doomed hero: John G. Diefenbaker?


Can those Trudeau Liberals just keep rewriting the rules?

Friday, February 7, 2014

A Canadian foreign policy? The idea.

I knew a wonderful cynic long ago who loved politics and wrote like a high-strung angel. Hunched over a cigarillo and a martini, he once shrugged, “Policy is as cheap as paper and a typewriter.” 

Finally, I’ve got it: policy — without law, resources, or responsibly — is just talk, in text. And talk usually is cheap.

This thought is not welcome in modern government, especially in policy shops, in constrained circumstances. Many policy activists, in fact, have set forth the proposition that even if government can’t do anything well, it can at least do important thinking — elevating our aspirations and passing on our best practices to less fortunate societies elsewhere.

Pretentious nonsense.

Along with the regrettable squander of talent, the treatment of policy as art has a malign narcotic effect: it interferes with our proper and continuing obligation to discover how to be more effective in this challenging world.

The above musings weren’t inspired by my own lost causes as a policy writer. Rather, they crystalized as I read two high-minded essays on the esoteric topic of "Canadian foreign policy" by two eminent Canadian journalists: John Ibbitson of the Globe and Mail and Richard Gwyn of the Toronto Star. Their thesis is the same: captain Stephen Harper has fundamentally changed Canada’s foreign policy — and not for the better.

This is both an easy and extravagant argument to make.

It’s easy to research. Formal government speeches and grieving former diplomats baldly tell the story: Harper is less multilateral and more bilateral in pursuing trade and upholding alliance priorities with the US. He doesn’t nurture or use soft power and he doesn’t trim alliance rhetoric in order to advance what’s called Pearsonian diplomacy. He misses chances to offer a Canadian twist on other countries’ strategic difficulties.

However, what’s the big deal? What the original "Canadian foreign policy" was and what it’s becoming now is almost entirely a domestic Canadian affair. Indeed, it is entirely possible that — apart from NSA eavesdroppers — the outside world has no appreciation that Canada’s best minds are seized with alarm because they think Canada’s government is approaching the world with a new agenda.

This leads to a twist on that nauseating conundrum about not hearing that noble tree falling in the forest: if others haven’t noticed Harper’s “Big Break," was there actually a Canadian policy there in the first place?

Canada is an American ally, with no enemies or special friends of its own. On strategic issues in Washington and in the Middle East, for instance, it supports America and Israel’s strategic imperatives. And it has done so, unswervingly, since the St. Laurent government and its popular External Affairs Secretary Lester Pearson helped Eisenhower help France and Britain surrender their last imperial illusions in 1956. Pearson was awarded a Nobel Prize, and Canada started listening to the rest of the world on behalf of Washington rather than on behalf of London.

Canada’s self-regard in foreign relations was not earned by making independently shrewd, noble, strategic policy choices. It was born of the passive crafts of diplomat.

As the senior English-speaking colony of the greatest power of the 19th century, Canada’s bureaucracy-builders decided on their own that they could be the next superpower’s empathetic listeners. They could listen knowingly to the powerful and the powerless. Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnston, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, the Bushes, Clinton (less so), and even Obama would benefit from timely gossip and nudges from Ottawa as they threw their weight around globally.

Talk in the Canadian federal government is often about policy, and talk about policy choices often leads to action. Trade policies lead to commercial initiatives; immigration policy changes affect workloads in embassies and the fates of thousands of individuals who want to live in Canada.

Talking geopolitics vicariously, however, isn’t doing strategic foreign policy. 

Have all those sophisticates in the Pearson Building in Ottawa essentially been talking to themselves? No. Tactically, Canada doesn’t send forces to every conflict or aid only to American priorities. However, Canadian foreign policy per se is pure words; their assembly and observation does little more than feed and clothe wordsmiths, who doggedly take themselves too seriously.

Tuesday, January 29, 2013

Keystone Pipeline: What’s Obama’s Plan for Canada?


Does Barack Obama care that thousands of decent Canadians—as well as Republican House Speaker John Boehner—get up these mornings wondering what he’s planning to do about them? It’s impossible to know.

Canadians don’t cry in public like Republican Congressmen or have an American television network to flesh out their feelings. They don’t also fear that Obama wants to "annihilate" them by springtime. Actually, they can’t frighten like Republicans because they suspect he has other more exciting concerns on his mind.

Intelligent life up here in Canada is cold and unfair; Canadians are infatuated by an utterly inscrutable President. In his inaugural address, Obama could speak of the love Oscar Wilde could not name. Yet he couldn’t offer a wink, even a whisper, of solidarity for his starstruck northern friends. (These are friends, incidentally, who’ve more than simply offered themselves up in lopsided opinion polls that count for nothing in US elections. Canada’s government has echoed Obama’s every move as a world leader. Does he think the Government of Canada has been playing the field? Benjamin Netanyahu yesterday, Libya today, North Africa tomorrow? Anyone in the Royal Family, anytime? Does he really think Stephen Harper wants to fly his F-35s or co-own his auto companies?)

Sure, Canadian politicians—like forward-thinking American business leaders ever since Richard Nixon was President—constantly talk about globalization and quarterly trade statistics that report that Canada is a little “less dependent” on the US market.  But, they don’t ever say they want to be free, with no way home.

Seriously. In that speech, Obama made a significant statement about America’s more realistic place in the world:

“America will remain the anchor of strong alliances in every corner of the globe.”

After the lobby against the Keystone Pipeline fails to persuade Obama’s officials that there’s an intolerable American environmental objection to going ahead, and after all those American states directly affected endorse the line, what is the American anchor to do?

The anchor of our North American alliance—the author of that fine statement—can’t blithely decide that he doesn’t like northern Alberta oil and that he owes it to the World and Hollywood to determine how Canadians develop their economy—all while meeting their international greenhouse gas obligations.

As a writer, a lawyer, and as a secure second-term President, Barack Obama will have no choice but to say yes. They’d be no mystery around this question if loyal Canada weren’t politically impotent.