Seamanship Quotation

“In political activity, then, men sail a boundless and bottomless sea; there is neither harbour for shelter nor floor for anchorage, neither starting-place nor appointed destination.”
— from Michael Oakeshott's
“Political Education” (1951)
Showing posts with label Bank of Canada. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bank of Canada. Show all posts

Thursday, January 21, 2016

Governor Poloz’s advice: You, not my bank, must change (Part 3)

Let’s agree that after 45 years of official indifference it’s time for our elected representatives and their agent—the Bank of Canada—to acknowledge that the dollar’s exchange price is a public responsibility, not strictly a market responsibility. It’s time they set aside some of their busy, busy work for a big-policy deliberation. It being 2016, however, we can’t just leave them free and naked to think on their own.

After decades of official silence, what might the government say about the dollar’s value? In the spirit of incrementalism, here are three positions of escalating significance and consequence. All would aim to influence the government’s overall fiscal and monetary choices, how we and the market judge those choices.

Hopefully, they would enhance our credibility and bolster our purchasing power on this continent and globally:

1. Make a ‘Strong Dollar’ Declaration of Intent:

This would go well beyond in-camera meetings with government officials and public lectures by retired bank governor David Dodge. New York, London and Davos bankers wouldn’t be the primary audience. Canadians would be told that the bank governor, the PM and the minister of finance declare that their policies and economic vision will support a strong dollar, not rely on a cheap one. 

Along with full employment, structurally balanced budgets and stable prices, the government would accept that a stronger dollar must also be a public objective. A stronger dollar would be a tangible benchmark for consideration in the next election, as well as a benchmark in the bank governor’s and economic minister’s performance contracts. If Poloz isn’t enthusiastic, someone else should have the job.  

2. Pick a Number between 80 and 85 cents:

Instead of holding interest rates below those set by the US Federal Reserve, the Bank of Canada could intervene to hurry up the dollar’s recovery. Going back to at least 80 to 85 cents against the US dollar would provide immediate relief to consumers and place a transparent government performance test on the table. Those economists who so blithely argue that we can carry a $30-billion federal deficit should agree that the bank has the resources and credibility to defend a modest exchange rate target. It was pegged at 92.5+/-cents through the ’60s when the Pearson Government created the CPP and Medicare, and negotiated the popular free trade Auto Pact with the US.

A value of 85 cents US would be a stretch for our least-cost-competitive industries. It would say, effectively, that if you can’t adjust, get into another line of business; ask for help, if need be, but stop expecting everyone else to stay 30% poorer. The bank would only have to intervene significantly in the currency markets if the government failed to secure the public and the market’s trust that it can govern within its means.

3. Make Getting Back to Parity a Medium-Term Objective:

The basic factors of production up here—worker skills, population age, public infrastructure, access to money, reputation for competent public administration and respect for individuals and property, urban density and global brand—make our growing-increasingly-diversified regions competitive with America’s own regional champions.

There is no security or excuse for perpetuating, as public policy, a currency below par. As they say: It’s not who we are.


All three proposals I sketched out would aim to take advantage, not alter who we are: a series of economic regions chasing the same material and social goals Janet Yellen’s US Federal Reserve is trying to serve. Yes, Canadian monetary policy (interest rates and money supply) and stabilization policy (government expenditures, taxes and deficits) would have to be in harmony with Washington policy.

Acknowledging that would still allow us to debate the underlying issue: Do we maximize who we are now—a capitalist satellite of the US and its Dream—or do we want to build another vision, be a more centralized social democracy or good ol’ fashion isolation.

But the status quo deserves better than a 70-cent dollar.


Monday, January 18, 2016

Governor Poloz’s advice: You, not my bank, must change (Part 2)

Monetary economists and real estate agents are shaking their heads these days. Listing and closing prices in Toronto are crazy and the exchange value of the loonie is crazy as well. This volatile state of affairs, however, actually proves to them—and their peers internationally—that their commodity markets are working, free of effective political interference.

Volatility is a sign of good health; sangfroid is their faith.

The Bank of Canada introduced its Free Exchange Rate policy just after Richard Nixon freed the US dollar from the price of gold in 1971.

The tectonic plates of the post-war free world—the economies of Western Europe, the US and Japan—had shifted profoundly and the US simply couldn’t afford to keep pouring hundreds of millions into exchange markets to let others exchange US dollar bills for gold at the irresistible bargain price of $35 an ounce.

The cosmopolitans in our government decided that Canada should act as a flexible plate as well.

Governor Stephen Poloz stands by their decision as if it was an act of nature. He would have us accept that it’s only fit and proper for the bank to not worry about the dollar’s falling exchange value—because not worrying about the fate of the dollar allows the bank to concentrate exclusively on supporting domestic economic growth.

Rising prices for breakthrough foreign technologies, for a family reunion in Florida and for imported fresh vegetables are not his problem and, therefore, shouldn’t be ours. Trees don’t fall in forests because I’m deaf.

Such free market dogma is ironic especially in the Trudeau family’s Ottawa. At the time the bank formally renounced further bank interference in the currency markets, Pierre Trudeau’s government was shutting down entirely the reemergence of free market prices for domestic egg and dairy products.

There are powerful arguments supporting our “faith” in markets. Private sector market forces will continue to drive and largely shape economic growth, with or without conservative think tanks and the shadow of Stephen Harper. But to work efficiently, markets need a little peace, as well as freedom, to “adjust.”

It would be neat if we had to pay a freely determined market price for each stamp we buy, each day, and each mile of highway and public transit we use each day; and if every toasty home and workplace had to pay for their exact distance from the source of electricity or natural gas they consumed each day. It’s plausible technically. Such an explosion of market signals would excite geeks, office accountants and hobby speculators. Yes, it would be disruptive.

Yet does the bracing uncertainty of daily price movements, with no logical long-term destination, work as a significant facilitator of positive adjustment?

Does the daily churning of daily market prices actually generate expensive, risky changes and long-term investments by individuals and their businesses?

Is the peaceful peso creating thousands more stable, middle-class careers in our tourist and entertainment industries in Vancouver, Calgary and Toronto compared to the so-called oil-dollar? 

Certainly, after more than four decades and as many business cycles, the evidence is in on the capital market’s response to—or indifference toward—volatile changes in the value of the Canadian dollar. Investment in fixed assets and real estate has been spectacular; investment in manufacturing continues to lag even in what we thought was the doomed, arthritic American economy. Canada’s investment and, consequent, productivity per worker—the middle-class’s source of before-tax income growth—continues to lag by between 20% and 25%.

Needless to say, spectacular investments in the mining and energy sectors have been driven by global commodity prices. Indeed, commodities drive the dollar—not the other way around.

Poloz has been around for a while. Instead of suggesting that flexible exchange rates help players in the economy, he should have said what he surely thinks: “Not complaining about what the dollar does to you allows me and other players in Canada’s governments to spend more to help you.”

He insists that his nonchalant, no-dollar policy is all the rage.

It’s what grownups do. Let’s look at the West’s club of champions, the G-7. The US, the Euro-zone and Japan, the world’s third- and Asia’s-largest market economy, accept that they rest on shifting continent-sized economic plates and must have currencies that float freely between them. Only the UK and Canada—not Germany, nor France, nor Italy—still imagine themselves as so endowed with continent-sized characteristics, obligations, privileges and policy options deserving floating currencies of their own.

Canada, at least, is facing a day of reckoning: we are suffering by holding to the decision of 1971; we may suffer if we try something else. However, we can’t deny that we have options. Let’s debate those options. For one thing, it would demonstrate that we’ve got over the PTSD of the Nixon Years and can use our freedom to think out loud in 2016. 

(To be cont.)

   

Tuesday, January 12, 2016

Governor Poloz’s advice: You, not my bank, must change (Part 1)

My father, his father and their business and political heroes never missed a chance to warn me that I’d have to reckon with the power of big commercial bankers. While their voices are mere memories now, Hollywood economists dramatically sustain their message.

However, the most taxing idea we face today is not our faith in Bay Street bankers, but our deference toward the Bank of Canada and the pronouncements of its incumbent and retired governors.

These individuals have all mastered one trade—managing, without political interference, a currency. The trade’s skill standards are exceedingly high and widely accepted around the world. (Indeed, our last governor, Mark Carney, was poached to run the Bank of England.) Nevertheless, in Canada, the trade survives only because we accept that the Bank of Canada (BOC) is indispensable to the management of those Canadian regions that are part of North America’s gigantic, integrated, mixed economy.

Canada’s and the United States’s economic regions—roughly a dozen from coast to coast to coast—are never in perfect harmony. Their growth and inflation pressures vary over time and that makes central management of money supplies and interest rates a complicated business. However, the existence of two full-fledged central banks—the Federal Reserve for 90% of that continental economy, and the Bank of Canada for the other 10%—reflects a political choice on our side of a border, not a neat, deep separation of economic aspirations, demographic and material characteristics, and domestic and international markets.  

Dad didn’t urge me to question his cherished Canadian dollar and the public duties of its BOC managers in Ottawa. He was a frustrated businessman, not a monetary economist. Fine. However, neither academics, special interests, un-muzzled retired government economists, nor fringe political parties seem willing to offer any reasons to be skeptical as well. They’ll quibble over the Bank’s individual decisions, but not whether they should be making them.

What the Bank is alone free to do is not insignificant.

The untouchables in the Bank are effectively anointing economic winners and losers across the country. Income tax decisions by the new Trudeau government are, as promised, giving some back to middle-class parents and taking more from the infamous and statistically persistent 1%. However, the impacts of the Bank’s policy of cheap interest rates and its benign indifference toward our depressed dollar are far more fine-grained, and significant. Without changing their ways in any way, some companies will make windfall profits while others, along with millions of consumers, become immediately, noticeably poorer.

Being adults, we’re expected to act like adults and sigh. 

This past week, Governor Stephen Poloz philosophized on the front pages that hard times will roll on but that having a dollar worth 71 cents US is for the best. Our cheap dollar is good for those glamorous few export sectors that have been praying for one and, sadly, is a necessary “adjustment” for the rest of us. His homily against a strong dollar is both obtuse and emphatic:

“Movements in exchange rates are helping economies, including ours, make the adjustments that must take place,” Mr. Poloz said in his speech. “This is exactly why countries choose to have flexible exchange rates.”

Poloz’s dares you: If you object to the 71-cent dollar, you have to be prepared to object to flexible exchange rates—that is, not having our dollar’s value freely determined by what the global capital markets think it—and Canada’s economy—will be worth tomorrow morning.


However, it’s quite debatable whether the flexible value of our dollar—floating up and down between $0.70 and $1.10 US over the last 25 years—has stimulated or actually frustrated “adjustments that must take place.” Further, adaptive economies elsewhere don’t necessarily choose flexible exchange rates, and adaptive economies elsewhere don’t necessarily need them. Rather, his modus operandi serves, above all, the unchallenged assumption that to be prosperous and competitive we need him, his institution and a separate dollar. 

(To be cont.)

Friday, July 31, 2015

National Keynesianism and democracy’s optimal playground (part 2)

There are two broad arguments used to defend the floating loonie: (1) its price is set in the capital markets and, therefore, is above politics and amateur discussion; (2) dropping it for the best alternative (US dollar) would immediately disrupt and permanently limit the Canadian government’s ability to maintain stable growth and pursue independent commercial policies. Both defenses have effectively gone unchallenged over 45 years of business cycles and swings in Canadian confidence and disdain for the elephant down there.

The first defense is probably the best. Our float, ladies and gentlemen, only performs at its best when those fidgety politicians and their wonks are perfectly still. Having agreed on all sides that complaining is bad form, it costs little politically to support it. The loonie’s devaluation (that nasty new 23% tax) does hurt us, of course. That hurt, however, is not something top performers at the Bank of Canada need feel for us, let alone address.

Last week, in the Report on Business section of the Globe and Mail, David Parkinson wrote a story entitled “Why the Bank Doesn’t Care About the Recent Inflation Numbers.” If he’d been writing about similar machinations in the Vatican, it would have been on the front page. Here’s Parkinson’s clean explanation on why it’s simply not discussable to worry that Canada’s core inflation rate, for the last 11 months, has been above the bank’s own 2%  ceiling:

“In its closely watched quarterly Monetary Policy Report this week, the bank reiterated something it has been saying for a while now: That the core rate is overstating the true underlying inflation in the Canadian economy. It is being juiced by some temporary rises in a few isolated components of CPI, and, more importantly, by what it calls the ‘pass-through effects’ of the Canadian dollar’s depreciation over the past year or so.”

The bank and its accountable governor can "pass through" the pricing of the Canadian dollar to the capital markets, but Canadians cannot "pass through" the affects. They must absorb them.

Devaluation, nudged by bank-rate cuts and deprecating statements about the economy by the governor, is prized in private by Keynesians as the only civilized way to “adjust” costs (wages, salaries, and benefits) in industries that can’t seem to keep up when the dollar was strong. It tightens everyone’s belts—supposedly to give failing industry’s space to reorganize to meet competitive pressures. This gentle, opaque process leaves our politicians unscathed—and, unfortunately, the economy’s 20% productivity gap unscathed as well.

The second defense idles in the distance, like Napoleon’s fearsome reserves. Literally, Canada’s freedom to act as a G-7 power requires that we accept the inconveniences and uncertainties of a standalone, floating Canadian currency.

In 1927, American jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes well served tax collectors everywhere when he explained that we pay taxes for living in a civilized society. In 1971, President Richard Nixon floated the US dollar in order to give Washington more freedom to manage the US economy within a severely changing global context. Ottawa still thinks that Nixon’s medicine for America was meant for Canada too.

Ottawa’s economic policy professionals insist that Ottawa needs a bank of its own that’s free to execute a responsive monetary policy for a uniquely Canadian economy. This flattering assertion rests on equally flattering assumptions. Canada’s economic circumstances are unlike America’s; its material aspirations, demographics pressures, trade prospects, business culture, and commitment to low inflation and full employment targets deserve the obeisance of a dedicated, separate dollar.

The historical adjustment mechanism of internal migration by people and capital from low wage and declining regions to more dynamic industries and regions, apparently, won’t happen continent-wide unless we totally erase our border.

Are Germans learning French? Has their common currency—the euro—turned French workers into Prussians? Do New Yorkers send their kids en masse to live in Houston to bolster national unity? Do Californians vote en masse like voters in New Orleans, Louisiana or Fargo, North Dakota? Does either of our two currency areas have in place a fiscal mechanism to deal automatically with economic shocks and Greek-style state bankruptcies that might befall some regions and not others? 

Really?

When Alberta is booming, is not Texas too? When Ontario is losing jobs to Mexico, does Michigan not as well? When jobs are scarce in Nova Scotia, are they not scarce in Maine? When real estate prices are white-hot in Toronto and Vancouver, are they not rising dangerously in booming US cities as well? Can you think of a year of depression in the US that didn’t depress most regions of Canada as well? 

A Keynesian from Mars would see that our two currency areas are highly diversified and viable—and divided from each other unnecessarily.

That’s an assertion that Martians and individual Canadians can make without making matters worse for the battered dollar they’re still stuck with. Wouldn’t it be lovely if we could have an informal discussion on the subject while the politicians are wholly preoccupied with market-tested election clichés?

Tuesday, July 28, 2015

National Keynesianism and democracy’s optimal playground (part 1)

Canadians of every income class are paying a new (and rising) 23% import and travel tax for the privilege of having a dollar that’s free to bob like a cork—a cork that magically accommodates Ottawa’s management manual for Canada’s internally loose and externally entangled economy. Do they in return, however, receive superior government for keeping a standalone, supposedly market-priced Canadian dollar?

Paul Krugman and other Keynesian scholars living offshore in New York and London admire our cork and believe that eurozone members—especially Greece—are suffering terribly because they no longer have corks of their own floating, in a sea of trouble.

The Canadian Nobel Prize economist Robert Mundell developed an alternative concept of transnational Optimal Currency Areas that helped convince the 17 eurozone governments to replace their individual currencies by creating the euro, in 1999. They hoped their OCA inspiration would do a better job of expanding prosperity and peaceful trade than continuing to let Europe’s tangle of national borders justify its tangle of currencies.

Canada’s state intelligentsia, to this day, barely gives the case for a transnational Canada-US currency the time of day. Overwhelmingly, those in the know insist that the status quo is optimum, that Canada’s economy is too different from that giant economy to the south to forgo having a cork of its own. And besides, why would our cork interest global thinkers in Washington?

As is so often the case, economic jargon and wonky gossip disguise raw self-interest and legitimate politics.

Friends of the Canadian dollar place the pursuit of national full employment and income equality over the pursuit of wider regional efficiencies and productivity. Proponents of a wider currency area, on the other hand, stretch “optimum” for the sake of distant liberal free trade benefits. Twentieth-century vested interests—in Canada’s auto industry, for instance—use “optimum” to justify not buying anything that’s not a perfect fit, immediately.

Certainly, the gap between the mixed economies of Germany and Greece is painfully greater than the six national borders between them. However, that gap between Canada and the US depends today less on one border and more on exactly where you live and work within either federation. Keynesians in both capitals are chasing the same economic growth imperative, almost in tandem, quarter-after-quarter, and, instantly, over the phone in emergencies.

North American business site-locators and investors carefully study regional census data, business cycles, and shifting consumer preferences. They worry little, however, about the respective professionalism of regulators and public servants or the chances of a comeback by Marx in Saskatchewan or even radical left or right separatists in Quebec or anywhere else. Cross-border Canadian and American white-collar and blue-collar workers ask about the quality of local schools, not whether they’ll be shunned in the workplace and in neighborhood stores.

Still, being human, government monetary economists are not likely to decide en mass that their lucrative, highly technical skills are unnecessary and serve an unnecessary currency. They will continue to believe and avow that there exists no sophisticated alternative to the Canadian status quo.

Okay, they needn’t be muzzled—but they shouldn’t own the podium.  

Whatever the ideological hype of their government, the Greek public overwhelmingly favors keeping the euro and seems ready to keep sacrificing to avoid going back to the glorious days of a sovereign drachma.

The euro represents in Greece not merely peace of mind for tourists and foreign investors, but now also genuine restraint on mischievous Greek governments that, in the past, artificially inflated their economy in order to finance extravagant and crony government. And while the eurozone doesn’t have a formal “sharing” fiscal union to complement its currency union, Greeks surely note that Greece has received—and is receiving—hundreds of billions of euros in help, in large part, because it’s in the euro currency union.

Greek middle classes and entrepreneurs are asserting the benefits of a common currency, believing it serves their interests, if not the interests of individual state managers. Canadians aren’t hurting as much and are more deferential.

Yet Canada is an exceptionally safe place to think out loud. We’ve done ourselves little harm when we’ve tried it before.

The Bank of Canada isn’t holding a gun to our heads. It merely represents a set of pro-loonie defenses that puff up the benefits of the loonie and shrug away the price we pay in forgone purchasing, in lower productivity, and in our ability to move money, products, labor, and ideas back and forth across our defenseless border.


(Continued)